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Background and objectives Blood donors, compared to non-donors, are more
likely to show a preference to help others either by sharing resources to directly
compensate those in need or indirectly by punishing those who act unfairly.
Knowing the dominant cooperative preference for blood donors will inform the
development of targeted interventions. We test which preference dominates and
an initial intervention based on these findings.
Materials and methods We report two studies. The first compares compensation
and punishment preferences in blood donors and non-donors (N = 372) using a
third-party-compensation-and-punishment game. Based on the results of Study
1, Study 2 (N = 151) is a feasibility experiment of an intervention based on
advantageous inequality aversion (‘As a healthy person, you can give blood and
help those less healthy than you’.).
Results Blood donors, compared to non-donors, have a preference for compensa-
tion. Organ donors have a preference for punishment. Those exposed to the
advantageous inequality aversion intervention, compared to control conditions,
show a greater behavioural propensity to donate blood (this was especially the
case for non-donors).
Conclusion Blood donors have a clear preference for direct helping through com-
pensation that can be translated into a simple effective intervention to enhance
blood donor recruitment and retention.
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Introduction
Cooperation within a society can be sustained either by
giving resources (e.g. time, money) to help someone in
need or by punishing those who act unfairly [1–3]. The
former offers direct help to an individual, signals compas-
sion and initiates reciprocity [1–4]. The later indirectly
helps individuals, in general, by enforcing wider societal
norms of fairness and dissuading selfishness [1–3]. Both
direct-cooperation and punishment are theorized to oper-
ate by reducing inequality and re-establishing fairness [5,
6]. While blood donors, compared to non-donors, are
more likely to show both direct-cooperation and punish-
ment [7–10], no study has compared donor’s preferences
for either direct-cooperation or punishment when both
options are simultaneously available. Thus, we ask for the
first time: ‘Are blood donors primarily motivated to care
for an individual or to ensure wider societal fairness?’
Knowing donors’ dominant preferences will indicate how
best to target interventions to recruit donors: ‘Do blood
donors donate to help individuals in need or to ensure
there is sufficient blood?’ This paper explores, for the first
time, which preference dominates for blood donors and
provides some initial data on translating this into an
intervention.
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Inequality aversion and preferences to
compensate or punishment
A Third-Party-Punishment-and-Compensation (3PPC)
game [11, 12] can be used to explore preferences for
direct-cooperation and punishment simultaneously. In a
3PPC game, a third-party witnesses someone being trea-
ted unfairly by a perpetrator and can choose, to either:
(1) compensate the victim, (2) punish the perpetrator or
(3) both compensate and punish, all at a personal cost or
can also choose to do nothing and incur no cost [6, 11,
12]. It is argued that people cooperate or punish, partly
because, they are motivated to reduce inequality between
themselves and others: they are inequality averse [5].
There are two forms of inequality aversion. First, there is
advantageous inequality aversion [AIA] which occurs
when a person is relatively better-off than another, and
guilt motivates them to reduce this inequality [5]. Second,
there is disadvantageous inequality aversion [DIA] which
occurs when one person is relatively worse off than
another. Here, envy motivates them to find strategies to
reduce inequality [5]. In this third-party context, inequal-
ity aversion suggests that the third-party would increase
the victim’s resources to a fair level and not over-com-
pensate, and reduced the perpetrator’s resources to a fair
level and not be overly punitive [6, 13]. Indeed, being
overly punitive creates an inequality that can be viewed
as spiteful and may be counter-productive as the perpe-
trator may feel unjustly treated and subsequently not act
fairly [13].
Philanthropic choice space
People’s choice of a philanthropic act (blood donation,
organ donation, volunteering or donating money) are per-
sonal, specific and differentially motivated [10, 14, 15].
For example, blood donors are motivated by feelings of
warm-glow and compassion [7–10] both of which under-
lie compensation in a 3PPC [4]. Therefore, it is hypothe-
sized that compensation will be the dominant preferences
for blood donors. Those who sign on the organ donor
register are motivated by civic duty and solidarity to pro-
vide resources for all [16–18]. As 3rd party punishment is
linked to enforcing fairness norm [1–3], those who have
signed on the organ register, compared to those who have
not, should have a preference for punishment. No clear
preference emerges for non-health-based helping.
Clinical trials approach
It has been argued that a clinical trials approach is
needed when developing interventions to recruit blood
donors [10, 19, 20]. Behavioural interventions, like
pharmaceutical ones, contain active ingredients that can
have side-effects as well a benefits [20]. Therefore,
national campaigns (Phase IV trials) need to be developed
via phase I (modelling), II (exploratory) and III (RCT) trials
[19]. In phase I, information is gathered on the potential
components of an intervention, and phase II provides ini-
tial evidence on an interventions effectiveness and any
unforeseen consequences. Set within this approach the
first study (akin to phase I) reported here explores the
cooperative preference of donors and non-donors. Study
2 reports a small scale laboratory-based experiment (akin
to phase II) to explore the benefits and unforeseen conse-
quence of an intervention based on findings from Study1.




As women, in general, are more prosocial then men [21]
a non-probability purposive convenience sampling strat-
egy was used to ensure an equal number of male and
female participants. We did not recruit participants who
were specifically involved in any philanthropy to avoid
bias [10]. The final sample consisted of 372 participants
(52% female, mean age 2212 years, SD 405 years).
Measures
Third-Party-Punishment-and-Compensation (3PPC) game:
Participants played a standard one-shot 3PPC game [12].
There is evidence that exposure to repeated fairness leads
to more free-riding and repeated unfairness to increased
punishment and compensation in 3PPC games [11]. How-
ever, revealed altruism shows that initial allocations are
more likely to reflect the person’s underlying cooperative
preference and as such we use a one-shot game [22, 23].
Participants read the instructions to the game and were told
that the game involved three players (A, B & C) (File S1).
They were informed that player-A has been given £10 ($13
US, 11 Euro) and told that they can share some, none or all
of it with player-B. Player-B has £0. Player-B has to accept
Player-A’s decision. Player-C (the 3rd party) has £5 ($668
US, 557 Euro) and can choose to spend some of this to
either (1) compensate Player-B, (2) punish Player-A, (3) do
a mixture of compensation and punishment or (4) do noth-
ing and keep the money. The decision was made efficient as
every £1 Player-C spends to compensate increases Player-
B’s allocation by £2, and every £1 Player-C spends to pun-
ish reduces Player-A’s allocation by £2. Thus, the partici-
pants were indicated to spend in £1 units.
The game was played in private and decisions were
made anonymously. Participants were told that they
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would be Player-C and faced a scenario where Player-A
had given £2 of their £10 to Player-B. The participant
then made a decision to either (1) punish Player-A (pun-
ish-only), (2) compensate Player-B (compensate-only), (3)
both punish and compensate or (4) to do nothing. They
could choose only one option. Participants were informed
that the game between A and B was hypothetical but that
they were playing for real money and the choice they
made would constitute their final pay-off. Participants
were told that a random number of participants would be
selected and paid based on the decision they had made.
Evidence shows that this payment procedure has no
effects on the pattern of results compared to paying all
participants [24, 25]. Thus, decisions made by the partici-
pant will affect their pay-off but not Players-A and -B.
Therefore, the participant’s decision signals their intent to
punish or compensate which is an important external-sig-
nal and self-signal about their reputation [26, 27]. Fur-
thermore, if participants were only concerned about the
actual direct effects of their actions on Players-A and -B,
rather than what their decisions signal, they would keep
the money and do nothing.
Assessments of Philanthropy: We assessed blood donor
status by asking participants if they have ever donated
blood (Yes, No). This question is a reliable and accurate
assessment of whether or not someone has donated blood
[28] and has been widely used to assess blood donor
behaviour [8–10]. We assessed other philanthropic acts as
follows: (1) volunteering (have you ever volunteered? Yes
or No), (2) financial helping (have you ever donate money
to charity? Yes or No), (3) organ donor registration (have
you registered to be an organ donor? Yes or No).
3PPC pay-offs, equality and fairness
The discussion below is represented in Fig. 1. The ‘Start
State’ has Player-A with £10 and Player-B with £0. As
the monetary allocation is unearned house-money a
50:50 share would be considered a ‘Fair Offer’ (=£5:£5)
[29, 30]. However, Player-A makes an ‘Actual Offer’ that
is 80:20 (=£8:£2), which is known to be perceived as
unfair [4]. Player-C can act selfishly and ‘Do Nothing’.
However, Player-C can restore a fair outcome to the vic-
tim (Player-B) by choosing the compensate-only option
and, on average, ‘Compensate-B’ by spending £15 to
raises their outcome to £5 (the £2 received by player-A
plus £15 9 2 from Player-C). This leaves Player-B with a
fair outcome [4]. Player-C can restore a fair outcome by
choosing the punish-only option and, on average, ‘Pun-
ishing-A’ by £15 decreasing their outcome to £5 (the £2
given away by Player-A plus £15 9 2 deducted). While
this leaves Player-B (the victim) with a less than fair out-
come it signals a wider socially orientated strategy to
enforce norms of fairness. Being overly punitive of
Player-A would be spiteful, and potentially counter-pro-
ductive as the transgressor may feel hard-done-by and
may act unfairly in future interactions [6, 13]. The most
equitable and fair strategy is to choose the ‘Compensate-
B and Punish-B’ option and spend £15 on each (£3 in
total) so that the transgressor and victim both have £5.
However, this is the most costly strategy to Player-C, thus
fairness can be restored more economically by choosing
to either the compensate-only or punish-only options.
Ethical approval
This study was approved following the ethical procedures
of the school of psychology University of Nottingham
(references codes: 534, 554 & 654).
Power Analysis
With respect to blood donor behaviour in economic
games, a medium effect size (Cohen’s d = 062; r = 028)
is reported for generosity in dictator games [8] and pun-
ishment (Cohen’s d = 067, r = 032) in an ultimatum
game [10]. To attain a power of 080, with an alpha of
005 this indicates that for compensation 41 blood donors
need to be compared 41 non-donor and for punishment
36 donors to 36 non-donors.
Results & discussion
Effects of sex and age on preferences
Preference choice did not vary by sex (v2(3) 0757,
P = 0860) or age (F (3, 367) = 0448, P = 0719). So there
is no evidence for bias by sex or age of participants.
3PPC preferences and payments
Consistent with the literature the majority of participants
chose compensation-only (n = 156, 419%) or kept the
money (n = 136, 366%) with punishment-only used the
least (n = 30, 81%) and ‘compensation and punishment’
chosen by 50 (134%) [11, 29].
Those who chose to ‘compensation-only’ spent on
average £163 (SD = 107) giving the victim £526 on
average. When ‘compensation and punishment’ was cho-
sen participants spent on average £145 (SD = 062) to
‘compensate’ (on average the victim’s outcome is £490)
and £150 (SD = 073) to ‘punish’ (on average the trans-
gressor’s outcome is £5). Those choosing the ‘punish-
only’ option spent £243 (SD = 104) to reduce the trans-
gressor’s outcome to £314. Thus, those choosing a prefer-
ence to ‘compensate’ or both ‘compensate and punish’
show unfairness and inequality aversion and those choos-
ing ‘punishment-only’ are more spiteful (Texts S2 and
Table S1 for more details).
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Philanthropic behaviours
Of the participants 257% had donated blood at some
time (N = 95), 422% had registered as an organ donor
423% (N = 155), 826% had donated money (N = 304)
and 903% volunteered (334).
Predicting preferences to cooperate
A multinomial regression model examined if a specific
preference to either compensate-only, punish-only, or do
both, relative to doing nothing was observed for blood
donors, registered organ donors, having donated money
or volunteered. The results (Table 1: Panel A) showed that
blood donors are twice as likely to choose to compensate-
only compared to do nothing. Those on the organ donor
register are twice as likely to choose to punish-only com-
pared to do nothing. Thus, those who have donated blood
show a preference for direct helping, resulting in a more
equal allocation to the victim and those on the organ
donor register for indirect punishment-only. There was no
specific preference observed for donating time or money
(File S3, Table S2 for robustness checks).
The options to ‘compensate-only’ and to both ‘compen-
sate and punish’ produced average allocation patterns
that resulted in more equal/fair splits of resources. There-
fore, the choices to ‘compensate-only’ and both ‘compen-
sate and punish’ were collapsed into a single category
that reflected ‘fairness and equality’. A second multino-
mial regression (Table 1: Panel B) compared ‘fairness and
equality’ and ‘punish-only’, relative to doing-nothing.
The results show that blood donors were significantly
more likely to choose a ‘fairness and equality’ option and
organ donor’s punishment-only.
This suggests that for blood donation, interventions
that emphasize a fair direct sharing of personal resources
to minimize any difference between themselves and
others in need would be effective. Study 2 reports on a
feasibility study to explore this possibility.
Study 2: Inequality Aversion: Transferring the
Resource of Health Through Blood Donation
The theoretical basis of the intervention strategy sug-
gested by study 1 is inequality aversion [5]. Indeed, moti-
vations based on advantageous inequality aversion (AIA)
have been reported as part of blood donor motivations
[31]. Here, the healthier donor is motivated to donate to
help those less healthy [7, 31]. Furthermore, models of
AIA suggest that guilt motivates this desire to reduce
inequality [5] and indeed, guilt has been shown to be a
motivator for blood donation [32]. Thus, a message based
on AIA should be an effective motivator to donate blood.
However, manipulating guilt may be disadvantageous if it
is perceived as manipulative [33, 34]. Thus, a message
that highlights inequality and enacts guilt without engen-
dering feelings of manipulation is desirable. It has been
proposed that this can be achieved using massages such
as ‘As a healthy person, you can give blood and help
those less healthy than you’. [7, 31]. This experiment
Fig. 1 Payoff patterns for the 3PPC.
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explores the effectiveness of this message against both an
anticipatory guilt message and a pure control (no mes-
sage) condition.
Materials and methods
Participants, design & power
A one-way between-groups design with 3-levels (antici-
patory guilt [AG], advantageous inequality aversion [AIA]
or pure control [PC]) was used. As there are no studies
comparing AIA messages, the association between guilt
and pro-sociality was used as the basis of the power cal-
culation, as the underlying mechanism for AIA. This is a
medium effect, with an r of 030 equating to a dcohen’s of
0629 [35]. To achieve 80% power with an a of 005 this
requires 40 participants per condition. We oversampled to
allow for some exploratory analysis with 151 participants
recruited using a non-directive convenience sample
(Mage = 209, SDage = 2019; 503% female). These were
randomly allocated to one of the three conditions, with
50 participants in the AG and AIA conditions and 51 in
the PC condition. Forty-nine participants described them-
selves as blood donors, with 28% in the AG, 32% in the
AIA and 35% in the PC conditions.
Messages
All participants were provided with an image depicting a
cartoon drop of blood followed by ‘Donate Blood. . .Save
Life’. Underneath the image, participants in the AG condi-
tion were presented with the slogan: ‘If people like you
do not donate blood, there will be continuing shortages
in the future’. [34]. The AIA appeal was as follows: ‘As a
healthy person, you can give blood and help those less
healthy than you’ [31] (File S4).
Table 1 Multi-nominal regression predicting specific cooperative preferences
Preference Predictor Coef (SE) P = OR
OR 95% CI
Lower Upper
Panel A: Comparison Across all Choices
Compensate only
Blood Donor 0667 (0306) 0029 194 107 354
Organ Donor 0246 (0263) 0349 128 076 214
Donated Money -0184 (0346) 0596 083 042 164
Volunteered 0830 (0448) 0073 223 083 567
Punish only
Blood Donor 0231 (0518) 0655 126 046 347
Organ Donor 0897 (0451) 0047 245 101 594
Donated Money -0401 (0563) 0476 067 022 202
Volunteered -0596 (0555) 0283 055 018 163
Both ‘Compensate and Punish’
Blood Donor 0730 (0410) 0075 207 093 464
Organ Donor 0192 (0369) 0603 121 059 250
Donated Money –0734 (0435) 0091 048 020 112
Volunteered 0678 (0609) 0265 197 059 650
R2 (Nagelkerke) 0062
Panel B: Comparison of Inequality Averse vs Punishment Choices
‘Compensate only’ Plus ‘compensate and punish’ (‘Fairness and Equality’)
Blood Donor 0682 (0291) 0019 198 118 350
Organ Donor 0233 (0248) 0349 126 077 205
Donated Money -0340 (0320) 0287 071 038 133
Volunteered 0767 (0405) 0058 215 097 476
Punish only
Blood Donor 0231 (0518) 0655 126 046 347
Organ Donor 0897 (0451) 0047 245 101 594
Donated Money -0401 (0563) 0476 067 022 202
Volunteered -0596 (0555) 0283 055 018 163
R2 (Nagelkerke) Blood Donor 0231 (0518) 0655 126 046 347
Reference category is a preference to do nothing.
Significant values are highlighted in bold.
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Reactions to the messages
After reading the appeal participants rated ‘to what extent
the recruitment advert made them feel. . .’ (1) ‘Guilty for
not donating blood’ (‘Guilt’), (2) ‘Healthier than others’
(‘Healthier’) and (3) ‘Like you can donate blood in the
future to improve the lives of others’ (‘Future Donation’).
They also indicated the degree to which they felt manipu-
lated: ‘Did you find the recruitment advert was manipula-
tive?’ (‘Manipulative’). All questions were answered on a
seven-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 completely).
Behavioural proxy
To assess if any of the appeals increased the desire to
donate, participants could take, at end of the study, infor-
mation on how to become a donor and/or make a dona-
tion if already a donor.
Ethical approval
This study was approved following the ethical procedures




The specific focus is on exploring any unforeseen conse-
quences of the intervention for donors and non-donors.
To do this it is necessary to compare, for donors and
non-donors, separately, variation in behaviour across
messages relative to the PC condition. Specifically, when
donors and non-donors are considered separately is one
of the messages more or less effective. A moderated logis-
tic regression predicting the behavioural proxy was speci-
fied (Table 2). Compared to the PC, this model showed,
that those in the AG and AIA conditions were signifi-
cantly more likely to take the information. The nature of
the significant interaction (Table 2 and Fig. 2), between
conditions and blood donor status, was explored used
Stata’s margins routines (Table 3). The margins analyses
(Panel A) shows that, compared to non-donors in the PC
condition, non-donors in the AG and AIA conditions are
more likely to take the leaflet. However, compared to
donors in the PC condition, donors exposed to the AG
condition were less likely to take information (Panel A).
For completeness donors, compared to non-donors, were
more likely to take the information under the PC condi-
tion only (Panel B). Thus, an AG intervention had poten-
tial detrimental effects on donors.
Evaluation of campaign appeals
A 3 (Intervention: AG vs AIA vs PC) by 2 (donors-status:
donated vs non-donor) between-groups MANOVA was
used to explore how the interventions were evaluated.
The overall model showed significant main effects for
intervention (F(8, 286) Pillia’s trace = 10565. P = 0000,
gp2 = 0226), donor status (F(4, 142) Pillia’s trace = 4565,
P = 0002, gp2 = 0114) and the interaction between
intervention and donor status (F(8, 284) Pillia’s trace = 2189.
P = 0028, gp2 = 0058).
For the intervention, there were significant main effects
for all four evaluations: (1) ‘Guilt’ (F(2, 145) = 20061.
P = 0000, gp2 = 0217); (2) ‘Healthier’ (F(2, 145) = 14865.
P = 0000, gp2 = 0170), (3); ‘Future Donation’ (F(2,
145) = 10636. P = 0000, gp2 = 0128) and (4); ‘Manipu-
lative’ (F(2, 145) = 15190. P = 0000, gp2 = 0173). Such
that, guilt was significantly higher in the AIA condition
(mean 3971, 95% CI 3551, 4392) compared to the AG
(mean 2776, 95% CI 2332, 3220) and PC (mean 2101,
95% CI 1668, 2514) conditions. Those in the AIA condi-
tion rated themselves as healthier (mean 4547, 95% CI
4005, 5039) compared to the AG (mean 3472, 95% CI
2953 3991) and PC (mean 2649, 95% CI 2166, 3132)





Anticipated Guilt 0026 3120 1147 8487
Advantageous Inequality Aversion 0049 2760 1005 7580
Donor Status 0006 9600 1896 48599
Condition X Donor Status 0009
Anticipated Guilt X Donor 0002 0040 0005 0315
Advantageous Inequality Aversion X Donor 0075 0147 0018 1209
R2 (Nagelkerke) 0073
Reference category for condition is the ‘pure control’ and for donor status it is non-donor (N = 151).
Significant values are highlighted in bold.
© 2021 The Authors.
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conditions. Those in the AIA (mean 5390, 95% CI 4865,
5915) and AG (mean 4796, 95% CI 4242, 5349) condi-
tions stated that they were significantly more likely to
donate in the future than those in the PC (mean 3699
95% CI 3184, 4215) condition. Those in the AG (mean
3571, 95% CI 3086, 40571) and the AIA (mean 2710,
95% CI 2250, 3171) conditions, rated feeling
manipulated significant more than those in the PC (mean
1727, 95% CI 1275, 2179) conditions. A Bonferroni cor-
rected post hoc comparison showed that AG was rated as
more manipulative than AIA (P = 0036: mean difference
0861, 95% CI = 0041, 1681). Thus, the AIA was rated
as less manipulative than AG, as more likely to encourage
future donations and engenders a sense of health, with
Fig. 2 Blood donor status by condition on behavioural proxy (Error bars = 95% C.I.s).






Non-donor 0268 (0114) 0019 0043 0491
Donor -0389 (0153) 0011 -0688 -0089
Panel A: comparison across condition
Advantageous Inequality Aversion
Non-donor 0242 (0118) 0040 0011 0474
Donor 0124 (0127) 0327 -0327 0124
Panel B: comparison across donor status
Base: non-donor
Pure control 0434 (0114) 0000 0211 0657
Anticipated Guilt -0222 (0153) 0147 -0522 0078
Advantageous Inequality Aversion 0068 (0130) 0603 -0188 0323
Significant values are highlighted in bold.
© 2021 The Authors.
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guilt as a motivation. Thus, the AIA condition is one of
low-manipulative guilt, energizing donation intentions.
Donor status was significant for ‘Healthier’ only (F(1,
145) = 10817. P = 0001, gp2 = 0069), with donors rat-
ing themselves as feeling healthier (mean 4035, 95% CI
3561, 5509) than non-donors (mean 3077, 95% CI
2751, 3404).
The intervention by donor-status interaction (Fig. 3)
was significant for: (1) ‘Guilt’ (F(2, 145) = 3310.
P = 0047, gp2 = 00410, (2) ‘Healthier’(2) F(2,
145) = 4587. P = 0012, gp2 = 0060 and (3) ‘Future
donation’ (F(2, 145) = 4809. P = 001, gp2 = 0062).
Examining Fig. 3 shows that for ‘Healthier’ and ‘Future
donation’ donors, compared to non-donors, in the control
condition, felt both healthier and were more likely to
donate in the future, with this difference disappearing in
both the AIA and the AG conditions. Also ‘Healthier’ and
‘Future Donation’ increase for the non-donors, compared
to the PC, for both the AIA and the AG conditions. Thus,
the AIA and AG intervention encouraged non-donors to
respond more like donors. For guilt, compared to the PC,
both the AIA and AG conditions resulted in greater feel-
ings of guilt for non-donors and the AIA for donors.
There was not significant different between donors and
non-donors, however, non-donors in the PC had lower
guilt than donors in AIA.
General discussion
These studies show, for the first time, that inequality
aversion is a potential key determinant of donors cooper-
ative motivation and this is directed at a person in need
rather than considering the wider societal need [5]. We
also show, for the first time, that an intervention focusing
on advantageous inequality aversion with respect to
health between the donor and recipients is potentially a
successful intervention to recruit non-donors. The find-
ings and implications are discussed below.
Blood donors cooperative profile
Blood donors and organ donors (both examples of health-
based philanthropy) have distinct cooperative profiles.
Blood donors, compared to non-donors, have a stronger
preference to directly help an individual in need to reduce
their inequality [5]. Those registered as organ donors,
however, had a preference for punishment which is con-
sistent with their concern for societal solidarity [16–18].
However, the level of punishment seen by organ donors
was overly punitive. This could be counter-productive if
the person punished perceives this as unfairly draconian
and reacts against this by continuing to act unfairly [13].
Finally, no specific preference was identified for non-
Fig. 3 Blood donor status by condition on message evaluations (AIA = Advantageous Inequality Aversion; Error bars = 95% C.I.s).
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health-based philanthropy for those who either volunteer
time or donate money.
Implications for Practice: ‘I’m Healthy, I can Help’
The motivational pattern for blood donors was to help
a relatively disadvantaged individual rather than ensure
wider societal fairness. This motivation to reduce
inequality is the likely causal mechanism for this pref-
erence. This translates into interventions that focus on
reducing inequality in health between the donor and
the recipient, rather than focusing on ensuring suffi-
cient supply of blood. As such, transfusion services
should not just focus interventions on helping the
recipient but emphasize both the relative difference in
health between donor and recipient, as well as how the
healthy donor can improve the relative health of the
recipient. We show, for the first time, that campaigns
with a slogan that encompasses this idea (i.e. ‘As a
healthy person, you can give blood and help those less
healthy than you’.) are a simple technique transfusion
services can consider implementing to recruit non-
donors. It is certainly an intervention worthy of future
consideration and development within a clinical trials
model.
Limitations
While behavioural willingness and behavioural proxies
are not perfect predictors of actual behaviour they are
good indicators [36], and a useful analogue within a clin-
ical trials approach to identify any potential detrimental
effects. Furthermore, it should be acknowledged that we
explored preferences in a one-shot game, and future
research may wish to explore any potential leaning
effects. For example, do donors compared to non-donors
start to express preferences for punishment with repeated
exposure to unfairness in a 3PPC game, or if their under-
lying preference for compassion raisins unaltered [11].
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